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most difficult hurdles to overcome for the global community of states represented in
the United Nations (UN). This paper demonstrates that due to institutional hurdles, it
is considerably more difficult today than it was in the early years of the UN to reach
a winning coalition in the General Assembly to secure Security Council reform. In
addition, the paper analyzes the effects that adapted patterns of voting, as prescribed
by recent reform proposals, would have on the distribution of power among UN
member states in the Security Council and on the probability that this institution can
form a winning coalition, i.e., reach decisions. Our power and decision capacity
computations are based on (modified) Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman measures.
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1 Introduction
Generally, actor preferences, combined with voting rules, strongly shape an
organization's policy outcomes. Similarly, the institutional foundations of interna-
tional organizations (IOs), and their respective decision-making procedures, crucially
affect actions taken by the collectivity of their members. For many years, efforts to
change the composition and decision-making procedures of the Security Council
have remained stuck in limbo, due to conflicting state interests, in spite of the fact
that most global actors share the perception that adaptations are needed, and do favor
change.
What proposals have been made so far to reform the UN Security Council and
what would be their implications in terms of the capacity of this institution to take
decisions and on the distribution of influence among its member states? Can
impasses for UN Security Council reform be overcome? Are the obstacles to reform
of a purely political nature, or could they partially be rooted in the UN’s institutional
provisions? A solution will need to strike delicate balances between what is desirable
and what is achievable, in order to find support from a large number of governments.
In general terms, Martin Rochester has argued that UN reform essentially needs “a
dominant coalition of states able and willing to steer the system in a manner that
offers incentives for others to follow” (1993: 223). Proposals made in preparation for
the September 2005 General Assembly meeting in New York aimed to achieve just
this, but still could not find the support needed to effect change.
Although there seems to be considerable consent among UN member states that
Security Council reform is needed, agreement on specific options for change has
proved to be difficult to achieve. In the UN, non-charter reforms are much easier to
achieve than are amendments to the UN Charter itself. However, each kind of
institutional reform always implies a redistribution of benefits and losses for an
organization’s entities, either in terms of a reallocation of decision-making power or—
and usually connected to this—a re-orientation of the organization’s policy perspectives.
Institutional structures themselves, however, may be an important cause for the
difficulty to achieve reform.
This paper focuses on decision rules in the United Nations (UN), notably in the
Security Council. It explores how decision procedures, by their institutional
properties, favor certain state preferences. Another part of the inquiry in this paper
concerns the effectiveness of decision-making, measured by the likelihood that an
organization reaches decisions. Accordingly, the paper compares the relative ease
with which decisions were made, on the basis of institutional provisions, in the early
days of the UN as compared to the present. In addition, the paper analyzes the
flexibility of institutional structures regarding their capacity for change—a topic
particularly salient regarding general prospects for Security Council reform.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two describes the origins and
objectives of the Security Council and discusses past and present decision-making
rules of this institution. Section three provides information on the way ‘decision
capacity’ and ‘relative voting power’ will be measured in this paper, using decision
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capacity computations based on (modified) Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman measures. In
section four, based on this methodology, recent proposals for Security Council
reform are evaluated. The final section summarizes the main findings and concludes
this paper.
2 The Security Council: Membership and Voting
The overall objective underlying the establishment of the UN Security Council was
to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Preamble to the UN
Charter). With the devastating effects of World War II still fresh in their minds, the
Great Powers, however, made clear that such an institution could not exist without
veto power being attributed to themselves. The legitimacy they claimed derived from
having prevailed as victors in the war, and thus being the most suitable to guarantee
future international peace and stability (Russett et al. 1997: 156). The negotiations
on the foundation of the Security Council resulted in the formulation of article 23.1
of the UN Charter. After the 1963 amendment, with which the size of the Security
Council was increased, its contents were as follows:
“The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations.
The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America
shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall
elect the other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the
Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the
contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international
peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to
equitable geographical distribution.”
Before this revision, the Security Council had encompassed five permanent and
six non-permanent member states. After the 1963 Charter amendment, the
composition of the Security Council was never adapted again, in spite of the
presentation of a variety of proposals for reform.
However, changes to the fundamental structure of the Council require high voting
thresholds to be passed, although some have described them as modest in
comparison with other international organizations (Voeten, 2005: 186). Nevertheless
it is the mark of the 1963 amendment, and those who were the driving force behind
its adoption, that enough support was gained to make the necessary reforms. As
Russett, O’Neill and Sutterlin point out, given the institutional barriers to reform of
the UN’s organs, any proposal for change needs to strike careful (and intertwined)
balances, such as “the balance between practicality and vision,” the balance
“between power (or effectiveness) and legitimacy (or justice),” and, perhaps most
importantly, the “balance of interests” (1997: 17–26).
However, the rebalanced Council created by the 1963 amendment could not
outlast the changing nature of the world, and critiques are now rather widespread
that the current composition of the Security Council no longer reflects the
geopolitical, economic and demographic realities of the present international system.
Accordingly, much attention has focused on proposals aiming to render the Security
Council more representative of modern UN membership. Particularly, the veto
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power of the P-5 has come under criticism, leading some to claim that the
persistence of the veto precludes the Council from being able to “symbolize
democracy” (Sutterlin 2005: 179).
Article 27 of the UN Charter presents the voting rules of the Security Council:
1. "Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members. On procedural matters there exists no right of
veto.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."
Hence, each Security Council member holds one vote and decisions on
procedural issues can be taken on the basis of a qualified majority of affirmative
votes cast by nine out of the total of fifteen members (whereas a simple majority
would be constituted by eight out of fifteen votes). However, decisions on non-
procedural issues require an affirmative vote by nine members of the Security
Council, including the P-5. These issues concern some of the most important actions
to be taken by the Security Council, including resolutions to establish peacekeeping
operations and the possible application of coercive measures against a UN member
state.
How are abstentions in the Security Council treated formally? Generally, two
basic forms of abstentions can be distinguished: obligatory abstention as referred to
in article 52, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter (implying that members party to a
dispute shall abstain from voting), and the more common form of voluntary
abstention (Bailey, 1969: 63–75). However, obligatory abstention has so far never
occurred in practice since UN states that were party to a conflict could argue that the
case at hand was not actually a ‘dispute’, but rather a ‘situation’, and in this way
escape the need for obligatory abstention.
Voluntary abstention is used quite frequently in practice. According to the UN
Charter, a decision of the Security Council on non-procedural issues requires an
affirmative vote by nine members, including the ‘concurring’ votes of the P-5. It is
not entirely straightforward, however, what ‘concurring’ signifies in practice. At the
UN constituting conference in San Francisco, abstention was understood to have a
similar effect to a negative vote. With a precedent set earlier by the U.S.S.R,
however, the effect of abstaining is no longer interpreted in practice as being equal to
a negative vote, but rather seen as a non-affirmative vote. Hence, the concurring
votes of the P-5 are interpreted as affirmative votes of the permanent members of the
Security Council present and casting a vote. Abstentions, in this sense, are less
consequential than are negative votes.
Non-permanent members of the Security Council are elected for two-year terms,
with five members being replaced every year. Representation has traditionally been
determined by regional affiliation: of the non-permanent members, three are usually
from Africa, two from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and
two from Western Europe and other states—Australia, Canada and New Zealand
(Baehr and Gordenker, 1999: 25). Patterns of representation for non-permanent
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members have also been discussed intensively in the framework of several recent
proposals for Security Council reform.
The attribution of veto power to the P-5, compared to non-permanent
members, gives this group of states high leverage within the Security Council.
There are obvious rewards to being a ‘mere’ non-permanent member, such as
prestige, the opportunity to voice a country’s opinion, and intermingling with the
chief power-brokers in global politics, but real voting power is not included in
the perks (Russett, 2005: 160). According to Kuziemko and Werker (2006), non-
permanent UN Security Council membership may also increase U.S. foreign aid
and development aid a country receives, notably through UN programs in which
the US is influential (e.g., UNICEF). According to the authors, on average, aid
received by a country from the United States, for example, increases by 59% and
aid received by the UN by 8% when it rotates onto the Security Council. As Dreher
et al. (2009a) have demonstrated, temporary membership of the UN Security
Council increases the probability of a country obtaining World Bank projects
(although the size of the loans is not affected). Similarly, non-permanent members
of the Security Council participate more frequently in IMF programs, and have
fewer conditions attached to their loans (Dreher et al. 2009b). According to Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith (2010), however, due to the fact that temporary UN
Security Council nations receive increased aid flows—by the U.S., but also by
institutions such as the UNDP, the IMF and the World Bank—they experience a
contraction of their economy relative to nations not elected to this institution. In
addition, freedom of the press tends to be constrained. These effects occur during
their non-permanent membership and the phase just afterwards and are strongest
for nondemocratic nations.
Clearly, non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council has some
advantages, but also disadvantages and non-permanent members are less influential
in decision-making in the Security Council than are the permanent members. Some
have gone so far as to say that in terms of voting, the veto effectively means there
are only five members of the Security Council (O’Neill, 1997: 63). How much
stronger is their formal influence—apart from the political leverage veto power may
generate—as measured in quantitative terms, allowing for the fact that member
states’ preferences may be similar? What is the likelihood that resolutions can pass at
all in the Security Council in its current form, versus in the forms suggested in
different reform proposals? How do different assumptions regarding the homoge-
neity of actor preferences influence these results?
3 Measuring Relative Voting Power and Decision Probability
How can relative influence be measured in accordance with specific voting schemes?
When analyzing influence within the UN Security Council, it is helpful to see how
weighted voting schemes may translate into relative a priori voting power of
member states, and how decision rules influence the capacity of these institutions to
make decisions, ceteris paribus. Power indices can be used to explore this topic. We
compute the Penrose (1946)-Banzhaf (1965) measure of voting power for the
members of the UN Security Council and the Coleman (1971) measure of a
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collectivity to act, but check for effects of alternative assumptions regarding the
likelihood that specific coalitions form.1
In general, power indices aim to capture the effects of the institutional framework
of an organization. They aspire to provide results that remain valid over a longer
period of time, and account for the range of different issues to be decided upon by
the institution and accordingly, the potentially changing patterns of collaboration
among member states. Effects of reform, for example the modifications suggested
for the Security Council, can also be assessed with these tools.
The ‘flexibility of constitutional design’ and ‘decision probability’ were studied in
the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). In general terms, increasing the
voting threshold within a committee, such as moving from the simple majority to a
two-thirds rule, lowers the probability that winning coalitions will form, leading to a
decrease in decision probability. Decision probability will here be measured as the
likelihood that a randomly selected coalition among member states can form a
winning coalition. When no restrictions on coalition-formation are introduced
according to the Independent Coalition Culture (ICC) principle, a useful measure-
ment of decision probability is Coleman’s index of the power of a collectivity to act
(Coleman 1971).2
Straffin (1977) has shown that classic power indices reflect specific probabilistic
assumptions concerning the votes cast within committees. The Penrose-Banzhaf-
Coleman measures assume that each committee member casts an affirmative vote
independently from all other members, with the probability of voting ‘yes’ of 0.5.
The assumption that all voting outcomes are equally probable is consistent with the
binomial model of voting in which each vote has an equal probability of being for or
against a motion, and all votes are independent. One consequence is that all
conceivable arrangements of votes, or coalitions, are equally likely.3
The key probabilistic assumption underlying the Penrose-Banzhaf measure is that
the votes are independent random variables. This assumption is implausibly strong,
1 In addition to this, in the online appendix to this paper which is provided on the webpage of this journal,
we present calculations based on the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954). While in most
voting games the Shapley-Shubik powers are very close to the Penrose-Banzhaf powers, in subsequent
calculations, compared to estimates based on the (normalized) Penrose-Banzhaf index, the Shapley-Shubik
index tends to provide higher voting power assessments for members holding veto power than for UN
members other than the P-5. However, the Shapley-Shubik index has been criticized by some authors,
including, on theoretical grounds, by Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and in terms of its empirical
properties, by Leech (2002b).
2 For applications of this index to the European Union, e.g., see König and Bräuninger (1997), Leech
(2002a) or Hosli and Machover (2004).
3 This assumption seems to be conflicting with actual voting behavior in an institution such as the UN
Security Council: clearly, “no” votes in the Security Council are rare compared to affirmative votes,
largely because of vote trading, and general pressures before an actual vote is taken, as will be discussed
later on in this article. In addition to this, if a negative outcome of a vote is likely, the issue is usually not
even voted on. We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this issue. In order to partially depart
from the baseline assumption inherent in approaches based on the ICC principle, our paper also provides
assessments for the situation in which votes cast by some members of the UN Security Council are in fact
correlated. In future work, it might be fruitful to also test effects on institutional inertia and power
distributions among actors when the probabilities of actors voting “yes” or “no” are adapted based on
empirical insights. Whereas such extensions are very fruitful, evidently, care has to be applied assuming
that observed empirical patterns in the past might be guidelines for preference distributions and voting
behavior of actors in the future.
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but perhaps less so if we recall that the purpose of power indices is to evaluate the
voting rule itself, abstracting from the preferences, behaviors and strategies that the
voters (committee members) may have. Independence is a rational assumption in the
absence of prior knowledge about the future issues to be voted upon and about how
divided over these issues voters will be. It therefore suits the purpose of measuring
the distribution of a priori or constitutional voting power that follows from the rules
of the institution. Moreover, restraining assumed coalition-formation to specific
patterns of preference similarity among like-minded states entails other risks:
patterns of cooperation and coalition-formation among members are likely to change
over time and members may form different coalitions depending on the specific
issues at hand.
In case of the Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman measures, we can check the robustness
of our power calculations by integrating empirical observations—correlations
between votes—into the analysis. To this end, we analyze voting behavior of the
P-5 in the framework of another, related institution: the UN General Assembly. We
construct a joint probability distribution of affirmative votes, taking into account
correlations between the votes cast by the members of the P-5 (background to and
results of this analysis are given in the appendix to this article).
Specifically, to assess voting power and decision probability in the Security
Council, we assume that votes cast by the P-5 are correlated (as estimated on the
basis of empirical voting records for the 1946 to 2002 time frame). In addition, as
the composition of non-permanent members of the Security Council changes on a
yearly basis, we assume that the votes of the non-permanent members are not
correlated, but rather independent of each other, and similarly, independent of the
permanent members’ votes. We continue to assume, however, that for all member
states—permanent and non-permanent ones—Ayes and Nays (Yes and No votes)
occur with equal probabilities. Thus we maintain some degree of a priori-ness
concerning voting by the P-5, but full a priori-ness for the non-permanent members
of the Security Council, as the latter change over time by being elected to these
temporary memberships.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the effect of the voting rule on the
voting power of an individual member, or the power of a collectivity to act, is
distinct from the effect of the joint probability distribution (Laruelle and Valenciano
2005, Kaniovski 2008). Coalitions that are winning under equally probable and
independent votes continue to be winning when the votes lose either property. The
only thing that changes is the probabilities of their occurrence. Put differently, the
effects of voting rules and voting behaviors on voting power are separable, except
when the vote is taken on the voting rule itself. It is the joint probability distribution
that conveys something about the preferences and strategies of the voters (committee
members). Clearly, states can anticipate the fact that they may, in general terms, be
closer to the priorities of some UNSC permanent members than others. This will also
influence their preference for one or several of the main reform proposals, as some
new states would then be in the group of permanent members—states that can
constitute friends or rather opponents in regional or global politics. Such
considerations also influence, for example, the evaluation of Pakistan of the reform
proposal by the Group of Four—which suggests having India as one of the new
permanent UNSC members—or the preference of Argentina, who is unlikely to be
Squaring the circle? Security Council reform 169
unambiguously positive about the prospect of having Brazil be a permanent member
of the Security Council. In this sense, rivalries among states within regions will
matter as regards their priorities for Council reform, and UN member states will
anticipate that proposals, although generating similar mean scores for non-permanent
as compared to permanent members, will nonetheless differently empower or
weaken particular states.
Our robustness check shows, however, that for the past and current configurations
of the Security Council, and in fact for all potential Security Council reform
scenarios, the discrepancies incurred in estimates of decision probability (and hence
also voting power) due to the assumption of correlations among the votes of the P-5,
are negligibly small. There are two rather surprising reasons for this. First, the
correlations between votes cast by the P-5 are quite balanced in the sense that we
observe clear US-UK-France and Russia-China probabilistic blocs. Positive
correlation within the US-UK-France bloc, coupled with negative correlations of
these votes with the votes of Russia and China, render the net effect on the joint
probability distribution, and hence also on voting power measures, small. Second,
the fact that there are more (in some reform scenarios even significantly more) non-
permanent members than permanent members in the Security Council makes the
effect of any correlation among the P-5 on the joint probability distribution of all
votes rather small.
In formal terms, we proceed as follows. Let V be the set of all coalitions, andW⊆
V be the subset of winning coalitions. The Coleman measure is given by:
Pðmotion is passedÞ ¼ l ¼ #W
2n
: ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), #W denotes the number of winning coalitions (the cardinality of the set
W) that can form among committee members, and 1/2n the probability of each
conceivable coalition under the ICC principle.
In general, the probability of the voting body passing a motion depends on the
preferences and the voting behavior of its members, as well as the voting rules. Over
a large number of decisions, these complex factors are likely to be reflected in the
probabilities of coalition-formation: some coalitions will be more likely to form than
others. To derive a generalized version of the Coleman measure of the capacity of a
collectivity to act, we may calculate Eq. 2:
Pðmotion is passedÞ ¼
X
v2V\W
pv; ð2Þ
Where πv is the probability of coalition v∊V. In the case of equally probable and
independent votes, the generalized measure given in Eq. 2 reduces to the one given
in Eq. 1. In this case, all summands in Eq. 2 are equal, as πv=1/2
n, so that the
probability of passing a motion can simply be expressed in terms of the total number
of winning coalitions #W, as in Eq. 1.
In general terms, decision-making with a decision threshold higher than the
simple majority clause, and with increasing membership, faces increasingly
steeper hurdles. This is probably part of the reason for the pessimism on the part
of several commentators regarding the prospects for UN Charter reform (Russett,
2005 and Sutterlin, 2005), as Charter reform requires affirmative votes of two-
170 M.O. Hosli et al.
thirds of the membership of the UN General Assembly, including the concurrent
votes of the P-5.
To analyze the UN Security Council, in which the P-5 hold veto power, and to
assess the respective distribution of power within this institution, a weighted voting
game can be constructed on the basis of linear extension. Subsequently, the scenario
will be explored in which a coalition in the Security Council is only winning—i.e.,
can only make a resolution pass—when it contains the affirmative votes of all
permanent members.4 Therefore, for simplicity, we do not account for the possibility
of abstention by members of the P-5.
According to this assessment, in the Security Council, in the first constellation of
UN membership, seven affirmative votes were needed to reach the required decision
threshold. Since 1965, the respective requirement has been nine affirmative votes.5
In order to calculate effects with the methodological tools presented above, for the
Security Council, a weighted voting game must be constructed that accounts for the
possibility that member states use their veto power. In addition, the game has to
account for the fact that no coalition in the Security Council can reach the decision
threshold unless it is supported by all members of the P-5.
For the Security Council prior to the 1965 amendment, this weighted voting game
is given by [27; 5,5,5,5,5,1,1,1,1,1,1]. Since 1965, weighted voting in the Security
Council can be represented by [39; 7,7,7,7,7,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]. Hence, the weights
for the permanent members and the quota are chosen in such a way that the
concurring votes (here interpreted as affirmative votes) of all permanent members
are needed to form a winning coalition.
4 Distribution of Power and Capacity to Act: Estimates for the Security Council
How have this decision rule, and the attribution of veto power to the P-5, affected
UN member states’ leverage and collective decision probability within the Security
Council? First, we will assess the baseline scenario based on the ICC assumption.
Table 1 presents the respective results.
In the past and current configurations of Security Council membership, the
(normalized) Banzhaf index indicates a clear asymmetry in favor of the P-5. O’Neill’s
slightly controversial assertion that actual power rests solely with the permanent
members of the Security Council (O’Neill 1997) is hence corroborated by these power
indices. In addition, respective figures on decision probability indicate that the
probability of forming a winning coalition, within the current Security Council, is
rather low (including less than 3% of all possible coalitions among members).6 In
practice, decision probability may be higher, as votes may be aligned on specific
dimensions on which the Security Council takes decisions. Nonetheless, this ‘baseline
4 Formally, player i has veto power if i \Wmin, i.e., if it is a member of every (minimum) winning
coalition (e.g., see Van Deemen 1989: 318–19).
5 Shapley and Shubik (1954) provide respective calculations with their ‘own’ index, the Shapley-Shubik
index, for the first constellation of UN membership. Figures for both constellations of the Security
Council, based on the Shapley-Shubik index, are provided, for example, in Ordeshook (1986: 467–68).
See also Taylor and Zwicker (1993).
6 The appendix to this paper shows that the assessments of the capacity to act are also valid if the
assumption of correlated votes is introduced.
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scenario’ provides some interesting insights concerning the general difficulty for the
Security Council to act, notably as the P-5 can block decisions with individual vetoes.
Of course, relative (formal) voting power is not the only factor affecting a member
state’s leverage in the Security Council. Political power and strategies such as threats or
side-payments are important in practice to gain the support of other members on specific
issues (or to at least induce them to abstain from voting).7 But institutional voting power
matters even if a formal vote is not resorted to: voting power can influence member
states’ bargaining behavior due to the common knowledge, for example, that members
can use their veto. Such patterns of formal power certainly affect even the many
informal discussions conducted among Security Council members. It is the interaction
between formal and more informal patterns of bargaining and voting that actually
shape decision-making by the UN Security Council.
In practice, for long time spans in the history of the UN, some permanent
members of the Security Council had a higher propensity to vote in agreement with
other permanent members. For example, the United States was in a particularly
powerful position in the first decades of the UN, since its views were generally
shared with its allies in the Security Council, notably the United Kingdom and
France. By comparison, in early phases of the UN, the U.S.S.R. was frequently
isolated. More recently, however, western states, and notably the United States, have
been forced to use their veto more often.8
7 On voting in the Security Council and side-payments, see for example Kuziemko and Werker (2006).
Table 1 Voting power and decision probability in the UN Security Council, 1945 to present (Normalized
Penrose-Banzhaf Index)
Member Category 1945–1965 1965–present
Permanent members:
China 18.10 16.69
France 18.10 16.69
Russiaa) 18.10 16.69
United Kingdom 18.10 16.69
United States 18.10 16.69
Total permanent members 90.48 83.46
Non-permanent members:
Voting power for each individual member 1.59 1.65
Total non-permanent members 9.52 (6 members) 16.54 (10 members)
Decision probability
(Coleman's index of the power of a collectivity to act)
2.78 2.59
Change in action probability compared to 1945–1965 – −6.83%
a) Formerly the U.S.S.R.
8 See Russett et al. (1997: 69): “The United States did not find it necessary to use the veto before 1970
since, until then, it could rally enough support from others to prevent a resolution that it opposed from
coming to a vote. During this same period, the U.S.S.R. had to use the veto 105 times, because it was
isolated and only through the veto could it prevent the adoption of resolutions that were contrary to its
interests. Since 1970, however, the United States has made use of the veto seventy times and the U.S.S.R./
Russian Federation only nineteen times, reflecting very clearly the relationship between the value of the
veto and the degree of isolation of a permanent member on substantive issues.”
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Increased UN membership, largely as a result of the de-colonization process, has
influenced power realities in the UN. Similarly, shifts in the geopolitical structure,
notably the relative decline in global influence of some of the victors of World War
II, the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., and the rise of new powers in the developing
world, have changed the global distribution of power in comparison to the
immediate post-war era. Many of the current criticisms of the Security Council
and debates about reform, centre on these developments, and have raised the
following points of concern: that those who contribute heavily to the upkeep of the
UN and its programs, specifically Japan and Germany, are not included as permanent
members; that there is no permanent seat (let alone veto power) for any
representative of the Southern hemisphere; that of the entire Security Council’s
membership, 46% are European (or European-associated), although they represent a
mere 20% of the world’s population; and finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
Council no longer consists of those countries most capable of maintaining
international peace and security, as the founders intended (Russett et al. 1997:
156–7).
In view of such perceived inequities, some recent suggestions for Security
Council reform have focused on one of the following options (or a combination
thereof): (1) abolishing veto power in the Security Council; (2) accepting more
permanent members to the Security Council (e.g., Germany, Japan, India, Brazil or
Nigeria); (3) enlarging Security Council membership by increasing the number of
non-permanent members.
Questions of fairness and the quest for more legitimacy for the Security Council
in world politics remain the drivers of reform. For example, according to a
representative of Cameroon, “there is a pattern of behavior that is shared by the
members of the Council, who, willingly or not, are often tempted to believe that
agreement between five is the same as agreement between 15 … little by little, it is
becoming a body of five plus ten members” (Mahbubani, 2004: 253).
Clearly, more factors than mere veto rights influence actual power in the Security
Council. For example, the ‘Cyprusization’ effect refers to the existence of a
longstanding issue, where deliberations have been made over the years in which
many of the non-permanent members have not been involved. In other words, only
the P-5 can effectively address these issues, since they have been integrated in the
respective discussions before: they have a continuous record of what has been
discussed over the years and in the context of informal consultations, and possess
superior information over other members.
In addition to the formal right of veto, another relevant aspect of power is that of
the 'hidden veto', a phrase coined by Céline Nahory (Nahory, 2004). While the use of
the veto has decreased since the end of the Cold War, the impact and the frequency
of informal consultations within the Security Council appear to have increased. The
quiet threat of the possible use of a veto is now applied behind closed doors.9
Consequently, the wording of a resolution can be weakened by the hidden veto of
the P-5. An example of this was the draft resolution presented in 2004 by France
9 “By giving private veto warnings before a veto takes place, the P5 can ‘convince’ Council members to
shift their position and still persuade the international public of their good intentions…Away from the
public and without any record of what has been said, the P5 have more freedom to pressure, threaten, and
even bully other members of the Security Council.” (Nahory 2004: 1).
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regarding the protection of children in armed conflict (Resolution 1539), the text of
which was based on a report of the Secretary General that provided a list of affected
countries. The United Kingdom and Russia opposed the draft resolution because
both Chechnya and Northern Ireland were included in the list, and hence, would be
monitored if the resolution were to pass. During the so-called closed-door talks,
however, the wording was changed from ‘armed conflicts’ to ‘situations of concern’,
which enabled the Security Council to unanimously adopt the resolution.
This ‘hidden veto’ is also important in the context of agenda-setting. It is not
possible to cast a veto regarding procedural matters, but threatening to use the veto
may result in the withdrawal of an issue from the agenda. There may also be a
‘double hidden veto’ in the sense that non-permanent members choose not to address
topics on which they suspect a hidden veto is likely to be applied. Clearly, these
informal patterns affect the more formal rules of voting in the Security Council.
However, the formal rules also structure the opportunities and constraints for
patterns of informal negotiations.
Reflecting about options for a change of the formal rules of decision-making in
this institution, the notion of 'fairness' has dominated discussions on Security
Council reform. Should the council represent the nuclear powers of the world?
Should it give a voice to the main economic actors and major contributors to the UN
budget (e.g., Japan and Germany)? Or should the qualifying criterion be that the
Security Council represent a majority of the world's population and its regional
powers (motivating the membership of countries such as India, Brazil or Nigeria)?
Recent suggestions for reform have mainly been aimed at enlarging the Security
Council and rendering it more representative of overall UN membership, without,
however, compromising its relatively new-found organizational efficiency. For
example, the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (2004) emphasized four main aspects regarding possible Security Council
reform: a) honoring of Article 23 of the UN Charter by increasing the involvement in
decision-making of those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and
diplomatically; b) bringing into the decision-making processes countries more
representative of the broader UN membership, especially of the developing world; c)
avoiding impairing the Council's effectiveness; d) increasing the democratic and
accountable nature of the Security Council.
Due to the diverse nature of UN membership, common notions of fairness or
shared values are hard to come by. In combination with the high institutional hurdle
for change, adapting the composition of the Security Council therefore constitutes a
considerable challenge and explains why there appears to be seemingly endless
debate on Security Council reform. Various proposals have been put forward over
time to adapt the constellation of Security Council membership, but none has yet
found backing by the required majority in the General Assembly. Recent efforts on
this issue have started again in June 2010 in the framework of informal discussions
on Security Council reform within the UN General Assembly.
The reform suggestion that came the closest to approval in the most recent years
was from the Group of Four—Japan, Brazil, Germany and India—that aimed to
expand the Security Council to a total membership of 25, by adding six permanent
seats without veto power and four non-permanent seats. The G-4 agreed to provide
Africa with two permanent seats in the Security Council (also without veto power).
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However, the African Union declined this suggestion in the summer of 2005, as it
aspires to obtain two seats for Africa with veto power. Further opposition came in
August 2005, from the new U.S. Ambassador, in cooperation with China, who
opposed the plan, claiming that the suggested formula is divisive regarding the unity
of every UN regional group.
Using the tools described above, calculations will be presented in this article
showing the effects on relative voting power and decision probability if some fairly
recent reform proposals were to be implemented. Two scenarios studied are based on
suggestions made by the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change (2004). As there is much discussion on the possible
'phasing out' of vetoes10—which would provide all Security Council members with
equal voting leverage—a further suggestion studied is the abolition of veto power.11
An earlier, more temperate proposal from Russett et al. (1997), aiming to increase
non-permanent Council membership, will be presented along with its anticipated
effects.
The High-level panel report made two major recommendations for reform with
respect to voting and representation in the Security Council, providing proof of the
difficulty in getting people to reach a consensus on this contentious issue. According
to one scenario (Model A), six new permanent seats would be introduced, without
adding new vetoes. Two of these seats would go to the regional area of Africa, two
to Asia and the Pacific, one to Europe and one to the Americas. In addition, three
new two-year term seats would be established. The ten current and three new non-
permanent seats would be allocated to regional areas as follows: Africa (4), Asia and
Pacific (3), Europe (1) and Americas (4). The second scenario (Model B) did not call
for the creation of any new permanent seats, but proposed the establishment of a new
category of eight four-year renewable-term seats as well as one new two-year non-
permanent (and non-renewable) seat. In each case, there would be a total of six seats—
permanent or non-permanent ones—for each geographical region.
Both proposals call for a Security Council in which five members hold veto
power. Figures in these models are different, however, regarding the total number of
four-year term non-permanent seats (ten according to the first proposal, eighteen in
total according to the second one). Also, the first proposal recommends introducing
three two-year term non-permanent seats, whereas only one such seat would be
added according to the second proposal.
Reactions to the above proposals have been mixed (Zedillo, 2005). Whereas the
proposals clearly are efforts aiming to implement improvements over the current
situation and to be feasible in political terms, Sutterlin bemoans the usefulness of some
of the suggestions for change, and is even more outspoken regarding the low likelihood
of success and therefore urges that the entire subject of Charter reform be ‘dropped’, so
10 The abolition of the veto has also been favored by prominent observers. E.g., see Tinbergen (1991: 4).
11 The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), although it
suggested two different models, was essentially also in favor of abolishing veto power. See paragraph 255
of the report: "Neither model involves any expansion of the veto or any Charter modification of the
Security Council’s existing powers. We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the
United Nation’s most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical
way of changing the existing members' veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an
anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age and we
would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake.”
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as to prevent “further disharmony among states” (2005: 180). In contrast, Urquhart is
slightly more optimistic, but sees the need for UN reform to become part of the
agendas of high-level diplomats, as opposed to “junior diplomats in the committees of
the General Assembly” (2005: 185). Similarly, Voeten urges that negotiations on UN
reform shift from the confines of UN headquarters in New York and receive more
attention at bilateral and multilateral summits, where trade-offs and bargaining are
common and often provide solutions to apparent impasses (2005: 191). In contrast,
Russett sees a danger in risking UN reform and watching it fail, and therefore suggests
focusing on the other aspects of the High-Level Panel’s report, such as terrorism and
human rights, while leaving the UN Charter unchanged (2005: 153–66).
The slightly more radical suggestion, which can be found, for example, in Van
Herpen (2003), essentially argues for adding Germany and Japan as new permanent
members, re-balancing the Security Council by having more representatives of the
southern hemisphere join as permanent members and finally, abolishing veto power
in order to avoid power bias in favor of the P-5. Voeten, however, considers it
unwise to include any changes to the veto in proposals to reform the Charter (2005:
195). Similarly, Russett et al. (1997) believe the retention of present veto rights is a
necessary evil if the reform process is to succeed, and focus on the expansion of
non-permanent membership (from 10 to 16) and allowing for re-election to some of
those seats. Nonetheless, they acknowledge the inequities that are perpetuated by the
veto, and suggest that its scope be curtailed to matters involving the “vital interests
of the great powers”, i.e., the P-5, as was intended by the founders of the
organization. They also suggest increasing the voting threshold to 13 or 14 of the 21-
member Council, thus further strengthening the collective position of non-permanent
members. Indeed the latter option (threshold of 14) would give the 16 non-P-5 states
a form of collective veto, as the passing of any decisions would require an almost
two-thirds majority of their number. Finally, in the case that reform is successful,
they call for a resolution that would institute regular reviews of Council voting rules
and representation, so as to prevent the institution from falling into such an archaic
trap again in the future (1997: 166–69).
In order to assess the respective effects of these proposals in both collective and
distributive terms, weighted voting games need to be constructed. It is assumed that the
decision threshold will again be approximately 60% of the total in each scenario
(as 7/12=0.583 and 9/15=0.6). Proposals A and B can then be captured by the game
[64; 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], where the five
permanent members with veto power can only get a resolution passed if nine other
Security Council members agree with the proposal (with a total of 14 affirmative votes
being required, or a fraction of 14/24=0.583). However, each member with veto power
is needed for the formation of a winning coalition, as the votes of the nineteen members
without veto power, in addition to the affirmative vote of four permanent members with
vetoes, would not suffice to form a winning coalition (as 19 plus 44 is 63, i.e., one vote
short of the decision threshold of 64 votes).
Table 2 shows the respective calculations in terms of a priori voting power and
decision probability for the proposals of the High-Level Panel.12
12 For the analysis of earlier proposals regarding changes in the composition of the Security Council also
see Wallensteen (1994) or Burrell (1995).
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According to the suggestions for reform incorporated into the report of the High-level
panel, decision probability, at just above 2%, would decrease by 18.5% compared to the
status quo. In distributive terms, a priori voting power would remain fairly constant,
compared to the current situation (see Table 1), when assessed individually, for
permanent members with veto power, permanent members without vetoes, and non-
permanent members of the Security Council. Individual power is about 14% for
permanent members with veto power according to the normalized Penrose-Banzhaf
index, whereas new permanent members without vetoes and non-permanent members,
in these scenarios, would each hold 1.7% of a priori power. Permanent members
would lose little relative influence by increasing Security Council membership.
Considered by groups, assessments are 68% (normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index) for
the collectivity of permanent members and about 32% (normalized Penrose-Banzhaf
index) for the non-permanent members evaluated as a group.
In order to assess the distributive effects of the proposal by Russett, O’Neill and
Sutterlin (1997), we must again construct a weighted voting game. There are two
options in the proposals set forward: both would maintain the size and veto-
entitlements of the P-5, but would add 6 non-permanent seats; both would allow for
Table 2 Voting power and decision probability in an enlarged UN Security Council: suggestions of the
High-level Panel (Models A and B, Penrose-Banzhaf Index)
Proposal High-Level Panel, Model A High-Level Panel, Model B
Adaptations ∙ six new permanent seats ∙ no new permanent seats
∙ no creation of new vetoes ∙ creation of a new category of
eight four-year renewable-term
seats
∙ three new two-year term
seats on basis of regional
allocation
∙ one new two-year
non-permanent
(and non-renewable) seat
Permanent seats 11 (5 with veto power) 5
Non-permanent seats (four-year term) – 8
Non-permanent seats (two-year term) 13 11
Individual voting power: 24 members, 5 with veto
power
24 members, 5 with veto power
Permanent SC members with vetoes 13.62 13.62
Permanent SC members without
vetoes and non-permanent members
of the SC
1.68 1.68
Collective power:
Permanent SC members with vetoes
(5 members)
68.07 68.07
Permanent members without vetoes
(6 members) and non-permanent SC
members (13 members)
31.93 31.93
Decision probability (Coleman's index
of the power of a collectivity to act)
2.11 2.11
Change in action probability compared
to status quo
−18.5% −18.5%
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reelection to some of the 16 non-permanent seats; but on the subject of the new
voting threshold they would allow for two options of 13 or 14 of the 21 Council
members. Thus, the weighted voting games are as follows: [53;
9,9,9,9,9,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] represents the proposal with an action
threshold of 13, while [54; 9,9,9,9,9,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] accounts for a
threshold of 14.
Table 3, in columns one and two, shows the projected effects of both the Van
Herpen (2003) proposal to abolish vetoes, as well as the proposal put forward by
Russett, O’Neill and Sutterlin (1997).
The proposal to abolish vetoes would strongly increase decision probability in the
Council to more than 27%, given the vastly increased number of possible winning
coalitions. Compared to the status quo, this amounts to a change in action
probability of close to 950%. It would also reduce the a priori voting power of
individual permanent members to just above 4% of the total. The balance of
collective influence between permanent and non-permanent members, according to
either index, would then be about 58% as compared to 42%. Hence, the latter
proposal would generate the strongest re-balancing of power between the P-5 and
non-permanent members, and would considerably increase decision probability
within the Security Council.
The effects of the Russett, O’Neill and Sutterlin proposal on voting power also
improve the lot of non-permanent members, vis-à-vis their P-5 counterparts
however, not as markedly as the previous case according to the Shapley-Shubik
Index.13 With an action threshold of 13 out of 21 members (62%), the collective
voting power of the non-permanent section of the Council is double of what it is
today, and the Penrose-Banzhaf Index records a similar doubling. This trend is even
more apparent when the action threshold of 14 is introduced (66%): in terms of the
Penrose-Banzhaf Index, individual voting power for the P-5 shrinks from 16.7% in
today’s Council configuration to a ‘mere’ 11.2%, while the Shapley-Shubik Index
notes a similar, if less emphatic, downward trend. Collective voting power for the
non-permanent 16 members of the Council improves almost threefold according to
both the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik assessments. Naturally, these
improved figures entail some sort of trade-off, and the drawback, in this case, is a
decline in decision probability, which is reduced from the current 2.6% to 1.9 and
1.3% respectively. A further effect of this proposal, which is not accounted for in the
calculations, is the narrowing of the scope of the veto. The above indices indicate the
distributive effects on decision-making when vetoes apply. However, for all other
forms of decision-making, such as election of the Secretary General, and admission
of new members, the voting power in the Security Council would resemble Van
Herpen’s suggestions, i.e., there would be parity among individual members.
Another proposal was tabled by the Group of Four and aimed to enlarge the council
by six new permanent seats without veto, and four non-permanent seats. Similarly, the
African Union suggested expanding the council by adding six permanent seats with veto
power, and five non-permanent seats. Finally, a proposal tabled by a group of about
twenty countries, labeled ‘Uniting for Consensus’ suggests expanding the council to
twenty-five members, but with ten new rotating non-permanent seats. Again, respective
13 See respective figures for the Shapley-Shubik index in the online appendix.
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voting games with vetoes have to be constructed to assess effects of these models.14
This proposal suggests making decisions on the basis of the simple majority rule, and
constraining the use of the veto.
Columns three, four and five of Table 3 provide an overview of the repercussions
of these suggestions in terms of both collective and distributive effects. The
proposals of the Group of Four and of 'Uniting for Consensus' are, although initiated
largely in opposition to each other, similar in terms of overall distributive effects, at
least when analyzing their institutional 'skeleton' (i.e., without specific country labels
attached to the new seats to be attributed). However, the Uniting for Consensus
proposal aspires to introduce simple majority voting. In these models, power
distributions between members with and without veto power are similar to the two
models proposed by the High-level Panel. Similarly, decision probability, due to the
formal maintenance of the veto for the P-5 (although veto use would be restricted)
without the addition of new vetoes, would remain fairly constant, but still be lower
(by about 30%) compared to the status quo. By comparison, the model proposed by
the African Union would spread veto power more evenly across regions, but would
tilt the overall balance of power even more in the direction of Security Council
members holding veto power. In addition, as would be expected, decision
probability, as measured with Coleman's index of the power of a collectivity to
act, would decrease quite strongly, to less than one-half percent. This constitutes a
decrease of almost 100% compared to the status quo.
Ian Hurd (1997) argues that in the face of the present inability to achieve the
much sought-after changes in the institutional structure of the UN—and specifically
the Security Council—the organization should make the most of its flexibility, and
use informal arenas to further involve those countries that deem themselves ‘beyond
the fringe’. He points to the example of resource-contributing countries, such as
Germany and Japan, whose contacts and consultations with the Council have
become institutionalized (Hurd, 1997). Indeed, he goes so far as to say that the case
for adding formal members to the Council is ‘scuppered’, as non-member states have
regular and well-established opportunities to participate in deliberation with the
formal members on a variety of issues (2007: 22). Jochen Prantl (2005) adds further
weight to this argument, similarly claiming that the informal arenas and modes of
interaction in the UN are ‘the way forward’.
5 Conclusions
The UN Security Council faces the challenge of institutional reform. Due to its
membership and voting rules, which essentially reflect the now largely outdated
power distribution that existed in international relations in the aftermath of World
War II, there has been much debate for several years on reforming its constellation
and adapting its voting procedures. Various proposals have been presented over time
ranging from radical scenarios, which aim to abolish veto power, to more moderate—
14 For the proposal of the Group of Four and for ‘Uniting for Consensus’, due to the fact that the number
of permanent seats with vetoes is 5 for both proposals, the respective weighted voting game is [65; 11, 11,
11, 11, 11, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]; for the proposal by the African Union, it is
[136; 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
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and more politically realistic—proposals, envisaging an expansion of the size of the
Security Council, without, however, sacrificing decision probability.
The High-level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) made two main
proposals to change the Security Council and in general terms, aimed to propose
politically feasible solutions, by suggesting the maintenance of veto power for
the P-5 and an expansion of the Council with a combination of permanent and
non-permanent seats. This analysis has shown that these proposals would result
in a moderate decrease in collective voting power for the P-5. The more idealistic
reform proposal put forward by Van Herpen—including the abolition of the veto—has
been shown to drastically alter the balance of voting power in the Council, as well as
greatly increase decision probability beyond its present levels. Many argue that
this is the only morally justifiable alternative, in terms of fairness as well as
effectiveness. However, such radical suggestions can certainly be problematic in
the context of global power politics and understandably, the P-5 are loathe to
relinquish their right of veto.
A less recent proposal by Russett et al. (1997) focused heavily on what is
desirable, but also achievable, deciding to retain the present veto rights, while
increasing the non-permanent membership. The results were favorable in terms of
rebalancing the Council and improving the position of non-permanent members. The
Council’s effectiveness, however, would appear to suffer, with a slight drop in
decision probability. Their approach is quite pragmatic, and as a result, is one that
could eventually make some progress in the current reforms impasse.
A recent proposal by the Group of Four—Brazil, Germany, India and Japan—to
expand the council has found fairly widespread support, but failed in the summer of
2005 due to opposition by a range of countries, including Pakistan, Italy, China and
the United States. Its distributive effects are similar to the proposals of the High-
Level Panel, and further increase the collective voting power of non-veto holders in
the Council. However, there is a slight decrease in decision probability. Meanwhile,
the calculated effects of the proposals made by the group ‘Uniting for Consensus’
are nearly identical to those of the Group of Four if the current decision threshold is
maintained. A shift to simple majority voting, in this context, would increase
decision probability and decrease the power of the P-5. The African Union itself
proposed six new permanent and veto-carrying seats, which virtually obliterate any
non-permanent, or non-veto countries’ voting power. A further drawback is the large
loss in decision probability as a result of their proposals. The aim to reach a
compromise on Security Council reform by the fall of 2005 hence proved to be
illusive, but discussions continue on an intensive scale about possible options for
reform.
In current discussions, the diversity of preferences among UN member states
regarding the modes to expand the Security Council and the specific states to be
accepted as new permanent members is widely apparent. What seems to be far
less clear, however, is that changing the Security Council was probably not an
easy endeavor in the 1960s, but, due to the much higher number of UN member
states, may have turned into an almost illusive enterprise today. As discussions
on Security Council reform show, large membership of international organiza-
tions may freeze institutional provisions, making change much more difficult to
effect.
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Clearly, finding a suitable package that has the potential to overcome the various
institutional hurdles for change, and to reform the Security Council, constitutes a
considerable challenge to the international community. Essentially, the developments
and changes in geopolitics that have occurred since the Second World War make
clear the need for urgent reform of the UN—particularly the Security Council—but
it is the myriad of effects, brought on by precisely these changes, that renders the
task of reform so arduous. However, the desirability of change can not be
overlooked. Reform of the Security Council, if successful in spite of the high
institutional hurdles to be taken and the broad divergence in member states'
preferences, could contribute to rendering UN actions and patterns of global
governance more legitimate and more effective in the future.
Appendix
Table A.1 gives Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between the votes
of the five permanent members in the UN General Assembly between 1946 and
2002 (the source is roll call data assembled by Erik Voeten, George Washington
University). To comply with the binary voting framework, we treat abstentions as No
votes. The correlation coefficients between Yes and No/Abstain votes differ little
from those between Yes and No votes.15
Next, we elaborate the procedure for constructing the joint probability distribution
that is consistent with the above correlation matrix. In a voting body comprising n
members, let pi∊[0,1], i=1,2,…,n, denote the marginal probability of the i-th
member voting in favor of a motion, and ci,j ∊[−1,1], 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, denote the
correlation coefficient between any two affirmative votes.
A voting profile is a binary vector v=(v1,v2,…,vn), whose i-th coordinate is vi=1
if member i votes affirmatively, and equals zero otherwise. Define V as the set of all
voting profiles, and V(i) as the set of voting profiles in which member i votes
affirmatively (i.e., the set of all binary vectors v such that vi=1). Moreover, define V
(i,j)=V(i)\V(j) as the set of voting profiles in which members i and j both vote
affirmatively, i.e., the set of all binary vectors v such that vi=vj=1. Sets V, V(i) and
V(i, j) contain 2n, 2n−1 and 2n−2 elements, respectively.
A joint probability distribution πv on the set of voting profiles V must satisfy the
following constraints, given marginal probabilities and correlation coefficients:
pv  0 for all v 2 V; ðA1Þ
X
v2V
pv ¼ 1; ðA2Þ
15 Assessing votes pre-1990 and post-1990 separately reveals that correlations between the P-5 until 1990
very much resemble the pattern shown in Table A.1, but with the negative correlation between Russia and
the U.S. being somewhat stronger (r= −0.50) and voting correlation between the U.S. and China being
almost neutral (r= −0.06). By comparison, for the post-1990 phase, the voting behavior of the UK and
France is almost identical, with r=0.92 between their votes, whereas the correlation between the votes of
Russia and the U.S. is moderately positive (r=0.2). However, China and the U.S. tend to diverge quite
often in the post-1990 phase, as r= −0.50, whereas the votes of China and Russia are hardly correlated in
the post-1990 phase (r=0.08).
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X
v2VðiÞ
pv ¼ pi for all i ¼ 1; 2; :::; n; ðA3Þ
X
v2Vði;jÞ
pv ¼ pi pj þ ci;j
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pið1 piÞpjð1 pjÞ
q
for all 1  i < j  n: ðA4Þ
The last equality follows from the definition of the correlation coefficient and the
fact that the votes are Bernoulli random variables.
Geometrically, the set defined by constraints (A1)–(A4) is a convex polytope in a
2n Euclidean space. Any point therein is a suitable distribution. Since the system
(A2)–(A4) comprises 1þ nþ nðn1Þ2 equations for 2n unknowns, it will typically
have infinitely many solutions for n≥3. We choose a particular distribution by
imposing an additional criterion. Following Kaniovski (2008), we choose the
distribution closest (using least squares) to the distribution in the case of independent
votes. This is accomplished by solving the following quadratic optimization
problem:
min
pv2V
1
2
X
v2V
pv 
Yn
i¼1
pvii ð1 piÞ1vi
" #2
; ðA5Þ
subject to constraints (A1)–(A4). The product term represents the corresponding
probability for independent votes. In full generality, the above quadratic optimization
problem can only be solved numerically, although slightly less general problems
have known analytical solutions.
Assuming pi=0.5, for i=1,2,…,n, and ci,j as obtained in the correlation matrix
shown in Table A.1, leads to the distribution of the set of 32 conceivable voting
profiles. Figure A.1 shows that the distribution implied by correlated votes is quite
different from the ‘uniform’ distribution resulting from independent votes. The
abscissa shows the 32 voting profiles sorted in descending order of the decimals the
binary vector v represents.
Table A.1 Correlations among the votes of the P-5 in the UN General Assembly
US UK FR RU CH
US 1
UK 0.611 1
FR 0.464 0.767 1
RU −0.361 −0.235 −0.152 1
CH −0.230 −0.093 −0.041 0.106 1
Calculations based on UN General Assembly roll call data 1946 to 2002 (collected by Erik Voeten, George
Washington University).
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Having obtained the probability distribution for the P-5, we can now embed this
distribution in a much larger set of conceivable voting profiles that includes the
Security Council’s non-permanent members. Let the total number of members be N,
of which n, n≤N, members hold veto power (the US, UK, France, Russia and
China). Assuming that non-permanent members vote independently with probability
0.5, the joint probability distribution of N votes is
pNv ¼
pv
2N5
for all v 2 V: ðA6Þ
Substituted into the generalized Coleman measure, the probabilities given above
generate the decision probabilities shown in Table A.2. Situations accounted for are
the past and present constellation of the Security Council, the two alternative
proposals contained in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change (2004) and finally, the proposal by Russett et al. (1997), with two different
scenarios regarding the voting threshold.
A comparison of the adjusted calculations for the capacity of a collectivity to act—
based on the assumption of partially correlated votes—with the standard Coleman index
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Fig. A.1 Joint probability distribution for independent as compared to correlated votes
Table A.2 Robustness of the Coleman measure to correlation
Coleman Adjusted Coleman
Pre-1965 0.0278 0.0265
Post-1965 0.0259 0.0251
Proposal A and B 0.0211 0.0209
Proposal by Russett et al. (1997)
threshold 13 0.0187 0.0185
threshold 14 0.0126 0.0127
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(i.e., analogous probabilities computed under the independence assumption) reveals that
the differences between the two assessments are small. Accordingly, measures assessing
the capacity of a collectivity to act are robust when using the assumption of correlated
votes among the P-5 (based on actual voting data) as compared to calculations based on
the assumption that members cast votes independently. In extension, this will also be
true for the Penrose-Banzhaf measure, as it uses the same probability space as the
Coleman index of the capacity of a collectivity to act does.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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